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Political Authority in Vietnam:  
Is the Vietnamese Communist Party a 
Paper Leviathan?  
Adam Fforde and Lada Homutova 
Abstract: In a contribution to the political analysis of contemporary 
Vietnam – a single-party state often wrongly assumed to be an author of 
reform and deploying considerable and varied powers – this paper seeks 
to provide an understanding of the Vietnamese term ‘authority’ (uy) and 
its relationship to power. Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan serves as a refer-
ence to the notion of authority in Vietnam and is compared to data: what 
the Vietnamese thought their word best translated as authority meant. 
The paper concludes that in the ‘two-way street’ of social contracts, the 
ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) actually has little authority. 
This helps to explain the chronic problems the VCP has faced in secur-
ing state capacity and generalised ability to implement policy. It high-
lights gaps between the current anachronistic use of Soviet-style power 
in Vietnam and what could be done if the regime deployed new powers 
based on authority. The authors conclude that, given the identified lack 
of authority, the VCP is no real Leviathan. Although more research is 
needed, this conclusion implies that proactive political tactics in Vietnam 
may move towards a search for acquiring authority in a ‘two-way street’ 
relationship within the Vietnamese political community. Enhanced state 
capacity and Party authority could follow. 
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Introduction 
Vietnam’s contemporary history is puzzling. In non-technical language – 
from the early 1990s an ‘economic miracle’ started in the early 1990s and 
a country, still apparently ruled in a coherent manner by an unreformed 
Communist Party, whose cities were dependent on food aid in the late 
1980s, had transitioned to middle-income status by around 2009. Such 
success is often believed to imply a clear story of focussed policy-driven 
change, a story in which a ruling Communist Party has adequate status as 
a coherent actor to be seen to possess powers to deploy needed policies: 
that is, ‘capacity’. However, there is abundant evidence to deny this pic-
ture. First, political conditions in Vietnam are not such that policies are 
as a matter of course coherently implemented, and there is rampant 
corruption and insubordination within the Party/State. Second, the idea 
that economic success stems from a strategic shift in Party thinking at 
the 1986 VIth Party Congress is actually a myth: success instead drew 
upon systematic violations of Party ideology dating from the late 1970s, 
if not earlier (Le Duc Thuy 1993; de Vylder and Fforde 1996; Fforde 
forthcoming 2018). Third, in particular, recent clear trends to an increas-
ing use of the large domestic security forces to contain rising popular 
discontent show a lack of people’s acceptance of Party rule and criticism 
of its failure to deal with corruption and to rule properly. This paper1 
presents an analysis that explains this situation as one where lack of au-
thority may be linked – although more research is needed – to the Party’s 
inability to present as a coherent actor. Our2 topic is relevant to wider 
discussions of the nature of the powers available to authoritarian regimes, 
                                                 
1  This paper has gone through a range of permutations, and we thank various 
anonymous referees, Ann-Marie Leshkowich, Bob ‘RFI‘ Smith, Haig Patapan, 
Joerg Wischermann, Nguyen Dinh Huan, Nguyen Quang Ngoc, Tran Huy 
Chuong, Bill Turley and many others for comments, insights, positive destruc-
tive criticism et al.  
2  Adam Fforde has extensive experience with the ‘participatory observation’ 
entailed by working as a development consultant in Vietnam in Vietnamese, 
which showed clearly the problems of state ‘capacity’ facing the VCP, and has a 
large list of academic publications on the country’s contemporary development. 
Lada Homutova is engaged in PhD research on how the system of campaigns 
(phong trào) inherited from the Soviet institutions of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV) and the early Socialist Republic of Vietnam (founded in 
1976 – the SRV) can be seen in use after the emergence of the market economy 
in the early 1990s, revealing attempts to manage issues of legitimacy and au-
thority. 
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but our argument stresses an inefficiency of the formal political institu-
tions of Soviet origin through which Party rule is manifest.  
Regime Survival or Regime Success?  
The central issue with which this paper engages is the assumption that 
the VCP is a coherent political actor. Rather, polities or regimes are not 
conscious entities, although observations of them often encounter pro-
nouncements of intention and statements of their actions. Clearly these 
terms refer to groups of individuals and the institutions, both formal and 
informal, that they occupy. In this sense, adherents to any polity will 
usually seek to secure a basic function: the ability of the regime to survive. 
This is not always the case, as the Gorbachev-led collapse of the Soviet 
Union shows. However, so far as can be told, regime survival does not 
appear to be the main problem of supporters of current Communist 
regimes like Vietnam or China. Believing their regimes to be robust, they 
do not want the status quo just to survive; they want it to be successful, 
both domestically and in international competition. To do this, they must 
have the capacity to act.  
There are many strategies for a regime to prosper rather than just 
survive. It can be sufficient to secure rule by coercive means (use of 
violence) but many prefer to use legitimising strategies to persuade the 
people (mobilisation, ideological persuasion, campaigning) about the 
rightness of their rule. However, for a regime to be successful, coercion 
or legitimisation strategies are unlikely to be sufficient. Effectiveness – a 
capacity to secure goals – is then on the table as a better key to success. 
Effectiveness means being able to secure several areas; amongst the main 
ones commonly identified for Vietnam and for other countries are order, 
stability, and economic prosperity. More generally, effectiveness as a goal 
for the regime has a more general aspect in the sense that state powers 
can be deployed to deal with problems, both old and emerging ones, via 
effective policy responses (good governance). If its adherents believe 
that the state can indeed deploy powers in such ways, one could say that 
they believe that there is adequate ‘domestic sovereignty’: regime survival 
can be secured under any – or most – conditions that might arise. Of 
course, this judgement depends upon regime adherents’ subjective views 
of the regime’s powers and possible threats and challenges. For ruling 
Communist Parties that draw upon Soviet formal structures and legacies, 
a major issue may be whether the old-style institutions offer the specific 
powers needed under conditions of a market economy rather than cen-
tral-planning, and with societies that are far more ‘open’ to ideas, travel, 
etc. The question can then be posed as to whether authority – understood 
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as an acquired general tendency ‘to be obeyed’ – can be deployed to 
create new forms of power suited to new conditions, and so a capacity to 
deploy state power into suitable policy and its implementation: to act.  
This aspect of the discussion can be related conceptually to whether 
the political community considers that there is clear domestic sovereignty. 
On sovereignty, Hinsley (1986) emphasises interactions between rulers 
and ruled, as a possible example of this ‘two-way street’:  
The concept [sovereignty – AF/LH] has been formulated when 
conditions have been emphasizing the interdependence between 
the political society and the more precise phenomenon of its gov-
ernment. It has been the source of greatest preoccupation and 
contention when conditions have been producing rapid changes in 
the scope of government or in the nature of society or in both. It 
has been resisted or reviled – it could not be overlooked – when 
conditions, by producing a close integration between society and 
government or else by producing a gap between society and gov-
ernment, have inclined men to assume that government and 
community are identical or else to insist that they ought to be. In a 
word, the origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are 
closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of the 
state. [2 - stress in original] 
This paper concludes that it must be a major and gathering concern to 
VCP adherents that while the Party seems able to secure regime survival 
via a combination of coercion and legitimising strategies, it appears to 
have been struggling increasingly with the issue of effectiveness. This 
conclusion, which is suggestive and not conclusive, derives from our 
research on what we see as a core problem, identified as a lack of author-
ity, both inside the Party/State apparatus, in terms of reliable hierarchy, 
and outside – in relationships between the Party and society. However, 
this research does allow us to conclude that we are not dealing with a 
‘neoliberal project’ and that the VCP is no ‘Leviathan’. 
Authority in this article is conceived as some quality of social rela-
tionships that means that society (or lower levels of the Party/State ap-
paratus) can be expected, normally, to obey their leadership, not because 
of the fear or force the VCP can deploy, but for some other reason or 
reasons. Thus, the lack of authority that we conclude from our data 
opens the door to a political explanation of the often-reported lack of 
state effectiveness in Vietnam. To repeat: authority (a general tendency 
to obedience) would allow deployment of new forms of power suited to 
new conditions. Without it, the Party must have excessive recourse to 
now anachronistic and ‘no longer fit for purpose’ Soviet methods.  
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Why Focus on Political Language? 
There is a common assumption that Communist regimes are powerful 
and coherent political actors but we raise the issue of whether they actu-
ally are coherent actors and so what ‘being powerful’ actually means? 
What is the difference between ‘having power’ and ‘having authority’? 
The important message of this article is related to our concern about 
how what is ‘right’, ‘true’ or ‘facts’ is treated by many in social sciences 
and the Vietnam-related literature. One might imagine that a political 
scientist should ‘know’ what authority and legitimacy are and what evi-
dence to bring to prove the point. However, after reading an extensive 
list of publications on arguably three of the most influential concepts in 
political science – power, authority and legitimacy – we ended up being 
more confused than enlightened (for example, Badie, Berg-Schlosser and 
Morino 2011; Goodin and Klingemann 2000; and Kurian 2011). The 
overlap of the three concepts is enormous and the use of the expressions 
interchangeably in scientific literature is often misleading and impractical. 
Political Science’s encyclopaedias are also not very helpful, as ‘authority’ 
is often treated as ‘see legitimacy’ or defined as ‘legitimate power’.3 Ulti-
mately, however, the aim of this article was not a definition of authority, 
but uses and explanations that may stand behind the term, and their 
relevance for Vietnam. 
The primary research problem is to access, in some way, an answer 
to the question of whether the Party has authority. We decided that the 
simplest way of doing this was to ask people what the ‘apparently equiva-
lent’ Vietnamese word meant. The logic here is that if there is no clear 
meaning reported, in the particular sense of authority as an acquired 
general tendency to be obeyed, then it is hard to conclude that the politi-
cal community is one where its rulers ‘possess authority’. However, dis-
cussions also pointed us to the possibilities of what authority in Vietnam 
might mean. We explore this issue in greater detail below. 
  
                                                 
3  These conceptualisations stem from the two distinct mainstream understand-
ings of the notion of authority, that of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt. We are 
closer to Hannah Arendt’s disruption between power and authority (Arendt 
1961); yet, in its complete form, even Hannah Arendt’s understanding of au-
thority is not entirely relevant for Vietnamese conditions. 
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What ‘Can Be’ Authority and How to Gain It in Vietnam? 
Two Examples 
The central issue of this paper is how to grasp a concept labelled ‘author-
ity’ and to use it to identify practical political problems in Vietnam: cru-
cially, how it can be seen as part of a shift from failure to exist as a co-
herent actor to a situation where ‘things can be done’. For us, such an 
authority is about relationships and a protection-obedience equation 
(that is, how shortcomings such as corruption may be tolerated and a 
regime obeyed if a population feels that that the regime ‘delivers’ protec-
tion and other perceived benefits). We seek to establish links between 
issues of authority in relations between rules and ruled and the question 
of the internal order (or disorder) of the apparat – the Party/State itself. 
There is a wealth of evidence that the authority of superior levels in the 
apparat is often weak; dealing with this and so improving the ability to 
deliver policies ‘the people like’ would seem a way to secure authority 
vis-à-vis the population. Instead, however, we suggest that it is useful to 
look at the causality the other way around – that authority conferred by 
the people upon political leaders gives those leaders power over the 
apparat. This allows us to engage with the vexing questions that arise if 
we confront the evidence that the VCP is very often not best seen as a 
coherent actor that drives reform and faces and addresses political prob-
lems.  
Two cases illustrate this problem. Both seem to be about authority, 
in the sense of some quality of social relationships that means that rulers 
can be expected to be obeyed, not because of the fear or force they can 
deploy, but for some other reason or reasons. In these two examples, 
accepted outcomes based on transparent processes, delegation of power, 
discussion, and responsibility for the outcome led to the emergence of 
new authority-based powers for leaders and increased efficiency and 
popularity.  
The first case is part of an evaluation of a Swedish–Vietnamese de-
velopment cooperation project, known within the cooperation as Chia se 
(chia s – in Vietnamese). This project saw funds channelled below the 
commune level – the grass-roots – the lowest level of the Party/State 
where a Party Committee and a People’s Committee could be found. 
Instead of working at the commune level, Chia se supplied development 
funds and worked through the lower so-called village level, and when it 
was operating this level was relatively less influenced by the Party/State. 
Elections to village leadership positions were sometimes reported as 
‘active’ (ch ng) and, as such, were not in keeping with Leninist princi-
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ples (Fforde 2011). Chia se had nothing to do with village elections, and 
simply supplied development funds to the village level.  
A communal People’s Committee chairman was asked whether he 
‘lost power’ (mt quyn – not an exact translation) as a consequence of 
using the project’s system for allocating local development funds direct 
to the village level and requiring participatory methods in place of the 
extant Vietnamese system (which worked through the commune level 
and did not require participatory methods). He replied that under the 
extant system, ‘it started easy but then got hard’ as it imposed manage-
ment burdens on staff. By contrast, he said that the Chia se system was 
initially hard to set up, but then became far easier as it attracted popular 
attention and support, which greatly reduced work for his staff and for 
the chairman himself. Therefore, the empowerment (trao quyn) of the 
Chia se system did not reduce his own power but actually increased it. He 
agreed this meant both that empowerment added to his own power 
because he gained authority (trao quyn nhn uy), and he also agreed with 
the suggestion that this meant that Westerners were clever (khôn), which 
caused the room to laugh.4  
The second case arose during a consultancy tasked to evaluate the 
Law on Cadres and Public Servants, working in three localities. The 
expectation was that the former would be political (‘Party leadership’) 
and the latter (‘State’) responsible for policy implementation, However, 
to the contrary, informed opinion (such as the staff of local Party 
Schools) were of the strong opinion that whilst the distinction between 
cadres and public servants should be clear, it was not, and there was no 
coherent distinction between political leadership and policy implementa-
tion. Further, the discussions linked this to an extreme problem of weak 
hierarchy within the apparat. However, the team also visited à Nng, 
where it appeared that this problem of insubordination was absent. 
Asked just how the local political leadership had managed to devise and 
implement effective urban development (exceedingly rare in Vietnam), a 
local businesswoman said that the politician concerned (the late Nguyn 
Bá Thanh) usually took three steps: he met with the population to 
“problematise” (“hình thành vn ”), he then set up a specialised group 
of local officials to deal with the problem, and finally he took personal 
responsibility that the group would actually perform. He put his prestige 
                                                 
4  Fforde was a consultant charged with evaluating the project and the discussion 
was carried out in Vietnamese to an amused audience of Vietnamese consult-
ants, officials and locals.  
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on the line and so his prestige gave him authority over the local apparat 
(interview by one of the authors, à Nng, 2009). 
Fforde owes to discussion with his close colleague Nguyen Dinh 
Huan the hypothesis that here there is a particular configuration of a 
more general ‘triangle’ of relations between people, apparat and the ‘local 
King’, and that these configurations are but different ratios between the 
constant length sum of the lengths of its three sides. Thus, in à Nng, 
the ‘local King’ was rather far from the apparat and so rather close to the 
population, whilst in other areas the Party was too close to the apparat 
and so ‘far from the people’ (xa dân, in the common Vietnamese phrase). 
This suggests in turn that increased state capacity requires a distancing of 
the local King from the apparat. This can be understood functionally as a 
distinction between, as Sun Yat Sen puts it, state capacity (nng) and 
political power, for him ‘people power’.5 
Both these stories suggest that whilst the Vietnamese as a political 
community possess resources for managing the political issues of what 
Party sloganising calls the ‘market economy with a socialist orientation’, 
this has to be put beside evidence that capacity to devise and implement 
policy, and so for rulers to acquire authority/legitimacy remains weak. 
The recourse to Leninist campaigns (phong trào)6  to ease the political 
problems created by widespread corruption suggests that, whilst these 
may ease the situation, they are the anachronistic legacy of very different 
circumstances. They also suggest that two very different activities (one 
an aid programme, the other a local political strategy) can both be seen 
as leading to the acquisition of an authority and so effective subordina-
tion of the apparat to intentional politics, and a shift of the Party towards 
coherency and an ability to be an actor – in another language, acquisition 
of agency.  
We now turn to locate these puzzles within a wider political science 
framework, linking them to questions of social contract theory and 
Hobbes, and to the common view that contemporary Vietnam is an 
example of a ‘neoliberal project’.  
                                                 
5  I.e. Dân quyn – for, for him, national independence is Dân ch, which is nowa-
days translated as democracy. Sun Yat-Sen aka Tôn Trung Sn, Ch ngha Tam 
dân, passim. See Nguyen Thi Lam (2012) for an official view that his thought is 
part of the origins of Ho Chi Minh Thought.  
6  Political campaigns in Vietnam are numerous and have arguably multiple func-
tions, among which the main ones are to emphasise certain issues and distract 
attention from other real problems.  
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Section 1 – Hobbes; Neoliberalism 
Thomas Hobbes and Authority: Vietnam 
There is very little discussion in the Vietnamese studies literature of 
social contract theory and how Locke and Hobbes both in their different 
ways as political theorists address the notion. This is itself interesting and 
suggests that this literature has paid insufficient attention to core parts of 
political science thinking. Here we seek to explain how these ideas are 
useful and how reflection on the differences between Locke and Hobbes 
is informative to understanding Vietnam’s political problems. We also 
believe that this discussion helps explain issues in the frequent identifica-
tion of Vietnam in the literature as a neoliberal project.  
Locke tends to focus upon ‘consent’, rule of law and limited gov-
ernment; Hobbes upon the ‘authorisation’ of state power. The former 
tends to be seen as more liberal than the latter; for example, because the 
powers of Hobbes’ Leviathan are stated to be absolute. However, we 
argue that, in examining the politics of contemporary Vietnam, we get 
far further when viewing the situation through a Hobbesian lens. This is 
mainly because, constitutionally, the Party’s position is deemed absolute, 
and as Constitutionally the prescribed site of acts manifesting domestic 
sovereignty challenges to its position are deemed absolutely illegitimate. 
The focus of this paper is to ask whether this works politically, and 
makes political sense, in Vietnam’s ‘socialist-oriented market economy’.  
As Thomas Hobbes wrote, the life of a man without a state would 
be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes and Tuck 2003: 89). 
Hobbes (1588–1679) was one of the pre-eminent state theoreticians and 
published his seminal work, Leviathan, in 1651. The central question of 
this work concerns the possibility of legitimate authority (that is, of the 
Leviathan or state) and, more precisely, what makes legitimate authority 
possible. Hobbes’s answer was the “state of nature”, which describes the 
human condition before states developed; for him it is a “war of all 
against all”, where individuals pursue their own goals, being driven by 
sense, fear and desire (Hobbes and Tuck 2003: 86–90). Rather than liv-
ing in such an unstable environment, men choose to submit to the au-
thority of a sovereign. This is a basic principle of all social contract theo-
ries: the idea that individuals agree to confer authority on a state. In this 
sense, individualism and a protection–obedience relationship are, in 
Hobbes’s theory, very important. We feel that much of the existing liter-
ature on Vietnam has ignored what is clear to political scientists, which is 
that authority is a two-way street: Party rule is felt by many contributors 
to be obvious, coherent and powerful, and shows it to be a key actor; yet, 
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as we hope our discussion of social contract theory shows, it is possible 
to argue that the population, by deciding not to come to the two-way 
street, prevents the Party from existing as a coherent actor.  
Leviathan has many different interpretations, framings and readings. 
One interpretation fears that Leviathan easily becomes a dangerous total-
itarian monster, while others see Leviathan as a prototype of a liberal 
constitutional state.  
So, where to from here? Is the Vietnamese Party/State an oppres-
sive and despotic Leviathan, or is it the notion of a Leviathan referring to a 
prototype of an authorised, if not democratic, state that is missing in 
Vietnam? We are not satisfied with a limited interpretation of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan as despotic and totalitarian. Rather, we note that comparisons 
between Locke and Hobbes tend to consider both men as students of 
the notion of a social contract, so that the position of the state is (in 
different ways) conditional upon its relationship with its subjects: it is a 
‘two-way street’. Thus, we take Hobbes’s “authority of the sovereign” to 
mean an absolute but accepted authority, one which citizens on the 
whole deem it to have, and which is authorised in order to protect and 
support them. 
Before we get to that, however, it is useful to discuss in greater de-
tail the context of current Vietnamese politics, and whether it is usefully 
seen as an example of a neoliberal project, as is commonly argued in the 
literature, for this appears to assume that, constructed as subjects, much 
of the population accepts and authorises Party rule.  
Neoliberalism in Vietnam?  
The Vietnamese studies literature contains much discussion of neoliber-
alism, which many accounts describe as the core of a Vietnamese ‘reform 
project’ (e.g., Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012; Nguyen-Vo 2008; Craig 
and Porter 2006; Akram-Lodhi 2007; McElwee 2009; Gillespie 2006; 
Salemink 2006; Harms 2009; Masina 2012, 2006; and Beresford 2008). 
As far as we can ascertain, most of these authors, with the notable ex-
ception of Beresford, are not trained political scientists. A shared theme 
in this literature appears to be that the Party is a coherent actor whose 
policies and interests in various ways have driven change as a ‘neoliberal 
project’ – thus, change is ‘reform’. However, this view assumes that there 
is a coherent capacity to implement policy, generally speaking. As we 
have argued, this is both challenged by much evidence (such as the lack 
of conceptual and practical clarity in the difference between political 
‘cadres’ and state ‘officials’) and also assumes the existence of some form 
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of social contract whose ‘two-way street’ sees the Party granted authority 
within and by the Vietnamese political community (more or less).  
On the surface, aspects of the view that Vietnam is a ‘neoliberal 
project’ appear to be correct. For example, since the early 1990s the 
Vietnamese people have lived in a country with a market economy. They 
enjoy a rather free national labour market (albeit without a general free-
dom of association – so far), are usually free to travel domestically and 
internationally (if they have the money) and have generally open access 
to the globalised society of the moment with its massive stores of infor-
mation available to anybody with a connection to the internet (with some 
limits imposed by the Party). Certainly, there is evidence that the Viet-
namese appreciate their market economy (Goertzel 2006: 4–5). 
In many, but not all ways, Vietnamese society is now ‘more open’. 
People in Vietnam often seem to expect to be governed as ‘subjects’ (as 
opposed to ‘objects’), and therefore, as citizens of the Vietnamese state, 
to have something like ‘rights as subjects’. In reality, however, we believe 
they are relatively autonomous economic subjects, and at the same time, far 
from free political objects. There has been no programme of political re-
form in Vietnam, and the design of the country’s formal political institu-
tions7 still rests on the same principles as before the market economy 
emerged. They remain those of an unreformed but post-Stalinist Soviet 
Union, originally designed under Lenin and Stalin but also those created 
by Khrushchev after the fall of Beria for rule over a closed society with a 
largely centrally-planned economy. In this view, formal political institu-
tions designed for control appear no longer ‘fit for purpose’. 
We argue that this situation has led to substantial problems best in-
terpreted as a lack of state effectiveness. 
First, in the past few years Vietnam has suffered from a slowdown 
in economic growth. Many have linked the Party’s inability to effectively 
deal with the situation to a failure to create a political landscape where 
implementable policy supports the social and economic institutions suit-
able for continued rapid growth in a market economy where workers, 
capitalists and others now make free economic choices. Many people are 
concerned about whether, and how, the country will transition through 
                                                 
7  Fforde and Mazyrin (forthcoming 2018) argue that the particular nature of the 
Soviet engagement from the late 1950s led to a softening of Vietnamese Com-
munist implementation of Soviet institutions, such as in the shift in the pattern 
of aid around the middle of the First Five Year Plan (1961–1965) in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) so that staples did not have to be secured 
from the collectivised Red River delta rural areas through violence (the 1950s 
Land Reform had seen plenty of that).  
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middle income status (reached in 2009),8 with the observation that this 
transition will require major implementable reforms of low-performing 
public sectors, such as health and education. The donor literature con-
tains continued implicit or explicit concerns as to whether policy is im-
plementable (for example, World Bank 2006: vii). 
Second, the Vietnamese press has widely reported that the Party 
acknowledges that the country suffers from high levels of corruption. 
However, despite strong Party expressions of its intention to deal with 
corruption, the Party’s government has generally not been able to devise 
– or, crucially – to implement suitable policies. Consider the following 
report:  
Results (Table 5) show that from 2009 to 2011, each firm in the 
sample paid on average from 460 to 600 million VND in informal 
costs per year (between USD 20,000 to USD 30,000), yet still 
made 512 to 646 million VND in profit before tax each year (be-
tween USD 24,000 and 30,000). The informal payments were 
equivalent to 78 %–107 % of the firm’s PBT (Profits Before Tax) 
[…] to make 100,000 VND in profit, a firm has to pay between 
70,000 and 100,000 VND in informal cost. (Nguyen et al. 
2016: 9)9  
Finally, at the core of the two abovementioned problems, there is evi-
dence from a range of sources that the general capacity of the VCP to 
devise and implement policy is severely limited. A striking example is the 
report cited in Fforde (2009: 88) as “Study Team 2009”, which shows a 
lack of effective implementable policy towards State Businesses (at the 
time producing 40 per cent of GDP): 
Ministries and People Committees […] do not adequately grasp 
information on the activities of these units. The Ministry of Fi-
nance is tasked on paper to carry out state financial management 
but only participates indirectly in the management of capital and 
assets via the reports of the Ministries and People’s Committees 
and of the units themselves. (Study Team 2009: 20, translated in 
Fforde 2009)  
                                                 
8  For an overview of the political implications and requirements of transition to 
middle income status see Gill and Kharas (2007), which stresses the need for 
an ability to devise and implement suitable policies, such as for crucial public 
goods such as health, education and urban infrastructure, an area where Vi-
etnam continues to face severe problems. On this see also World Bank (2011 
and 2013), Ohno (n/d), Tran Van Tho (2013), and Berliner, Thanh, and 
McCarty (2013).  
9  The exchange rates used are those of the original – AF/LH.  
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This suggests openly that the Party/State hierarchy is riddled with insub-
ordinate activities, encapsulated by the pithy Vietnamese phrase- “trên 
bo d	
i không nghe” (“superiors instruct, inferior levels do not listen”).10 
Clearly, for its adherents – and others – such evidence pushes for the 
conclusion that the regime is ineffective.  
This starts to raise strong questions about views that Vietnam is an 
example of a neoliberal project, where an authoritarian regime possesses 
enough acquired authority to deploy new suitable powers to solve new 
problems, governing subjects. Many of the views we refer to could per-
haps be thought of as not fully thought-through because, as deployed in 
the Vietnam studies literature, the term ‘neoliberal’, relating to political 
projects as ‘reform’, seems to refer more to attempts to rely on an exten-
sive use of markets. Crucially for our purposes, we believe that this pre-
sumes an ability to govern subjects whose free choices dominate society 
(e.g. Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012: 394, or Nguyen-Vo 2008: xviii). 
This conflates political and economic subjectivity.  
The next section brings our arguments together and lays out our 
methodology and method. Our central point is that members of a politi-
cal community whose rulers have acquired authority will be able to pro-
vide clear answers to the question ‘what does your word for authority 
mean?’ The answers reveal and articulate their beliefs that authority is 
something that is acquired, rather than simply a force that has to be 
obeyed. They are, thus – for them – political subjects. 
Section 2 – Methodology and Method 
One Concept of Authority? 
To the question ‘what is authority?’ mainstream political science (since 
Max Weber) has usually answered, ‘legitimate power’. If we think of 
authority as legitimate power, then our primary question should be why 
people in Vietnam believe that the VCP should rule (for example, should 
it legitimately use coercive power). That is, on what basis is this rule 
legitimate? And what are the beliefs supporting it? For example: Viet-
namese people believe the VCP can lead them to a just communist socie-
ty (goal); or the VCP deserves to rule because it improves living stand-
                                                 
10  Quoted in Fforde (2011). For a Vietnamese discussion, see, amongst many 
others, Ngc Linh (2015), who largely blames it on male testosterone. Making 
some distinction between an intention-bearing political ‘cadre’ and a functional 
‘state official’ is surely crucial to any understanding of sovereignty within the 
State itself. See also Gainsborough (2010).  
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ards of people in Vietnam (performance); or purely irrationally, the VCP 
is persuasive and people believe in what the VCP says: we are doing 
everything ‘because of the people, with the people and for the people’ 
(charismatic authority). For us, however, the answer that authority is 
legitimate power is rather dissatisfying because it leads to the questions 
above, which we find to be less relevant in the Vietnamese context, and 
because it does not allow us to view concepts such as authority as evolv-
ing, open and part of specific political discussions and contentions. If we 
say ‘authority is’, we are claiming to consider authority as something that 
is ‘given’, a substance, something with a stable referent; this is to exclude 
the option that authority refers to something dynamic. Therefore, the 
more accurate reference is to ‘an’ authority.  
In addition, as we have already mentioned, there is the question of 
state capacity. As Mary McAuley pointed out some years ago, the particu-
lar sorts of power deployed by Soviet regimes can be thought of as far 
more limited than might be imagined (McAuley 1977; cited in Fforde 
2013: 3). This may limit the ability to develop state capacity, such as the 
introduction of new systems and policies to suit new conditions. The 
authority of a regime will not be available to be deployed to command 
obedience in new situations, where new forms of power are needed. Our 
emphasis is on the political acts required to make this happen (as seems 
to have been the case in à Nng, presented above).  
In the next part of this paper, we will show how different framings 
of authority can point to these new political options, as well as problems 
of such framings. In the Vietnam studies literature, for example, the 
common view just discussed, that Vietnam is an example of a ‘neoliberal 
project’, has recently been challenged in a way that brings to the fore the 
issue of authority (Cherry 2016). For us, the value of Cherry’s contribu-
tion is that he shows different framings of Leviathan. On the one hand, 
Cherry treats Hobbes’s views as an option for the Vietnamese people as 
they explore possibilities for their political community:  
Hobbes wrote in Leviathan that a sovereign has by the authority 
“given him by every particular man in the commonwealth […] the 
use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by ter-
ror thereof, he is enabled to form the will of them all, to peace at 
home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.”23 Sovereignty 
consists, therefore, in the recognition of the supreme authority of 
the sovereign in a territory. This authority is necessary unitary and 
absolute. But Hobbes was aware that such power could be chal-
lenged or contested, even if it could not be shared. [page 7] 
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In this framing, an authority is relational, and therefore acquired. It is not 
inherent in whoever or whatever rules, but may be ‘given’ by the popula-
tion to their rulers, or may be withheld (a ‘two-way street’). Clearly – as 
the à Nng story above suggests – this might be a viable option; it is an 
authority that might be created in Vietnam.  
On the other hand, Cherry included a description of Peter 
Zinoman’s account in which a real and existing Leviathan, the VCP, is 
oppressive and despotic:  
By turning our attention to the fashioning of Leviathan in preced-
ing periods, Peter Zinoman has suggested, historians might better 
understand the origins of the violent and highly repressive state in 
Vietnam today […].11 
In Zinoman’s framing, any authority the ruler might have is dependent 
upon choices made, not by those ruled, but by the ruler. This treats so-
cial contracts as ‘one-way streets’, which we think is misleading.  
We therefore frame Hobbes’s Leviathan as an option, rather than an 
existing reality; an option for the creation of a relationship between rul-
ers and ruled where the ruled confer an authority on the ruling VCP. 
That option is understood as a potential that may, or may not, happen in 
Vietnam. As Hobbes did, we have focused on the possibilities for creat-
ing political order in Vietnam. Our research concludes that, because 
people do not explain the term in a way consistent with this, the Party 
does not (yet?) have an acquired authority.  
Before we present our data, a last preliminary issue is a more de-
tailed account of our interpretation of Hobbes’s Leviathan, one in which 
we see a potential normative proposition for Vietnamese politics (specif-
ic to identified local, Vietnamese, needs). Apart from arguing that 
Hobbes’s Leviathan is not a despotic monster, how here do we interpret 
Hobbes? 
Leviathan in Our Normative Proposition 
Having so far left our interpretation of Leviathan rather general, we now 
address this issue more specifically. In our reading, an important element 
in Hobbes’s Leviathan is the possibility of a creation of an order, in 
which individuals confer authority on a sovereign. Within this are two 
                                                 
11  However, Cherry did add that “And what historians need to understand, the 
contemporary Vietnamese state must also try to understand. For as Furnivall 
warned, ‘Leviathan himself must fail unless he can adapt himself to human na-
ture’” (Cherry 2016). 
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components that are often confused as one. The first component is that 
Leviathan necessarily obtains absolute power, coercive in nature, to be 
deployed in any manner, with the asserted goal of protecting and sup-
porting people. This view obscures any the basis of this relationship in a 
social contract, the product of a ‘two-way street’. This reading leads 
many to see Leviathan as a potential danger – of unbound power. How-
ever, protection is an important component in this equation.  
In thinking about Vietnamese politics, in our reading of Hobbes, 
the second component (often overlooked) is that Leviathan, as a political 
project, has to secure an order including stable hierarchies (a functioning 
state), such that he/she is enabled to protect people. Crucially, there 
must be state capacity. This, in addition to the obvious need for a coer-
cive apparat, implies a need for governing, of subjects, which secures the 
ability of Leviathan to actually protect people and keep the state running. 
This is challenged in any examination of contemporary Vietnam by the 
Vietnamese sense (used above) of pervasive “trên bo d	
i không nghe” 
(“superiors instruct, inferior levels do not listen”). The Party’s security 
apparatus is powerful, but governing, it would now seem, requires differ-
ent types of power: power to do something, rather than power over 
someone. Here we are using perhaps an unusual reading. We are aware 
that the relationship between rulers and ruled is Hobbes’ main focus, 
rather than that between, in his language, the king and his officials; that 
is, the patterns of hierarchy within the State, its ‘internal sovereignty’. Yet, 
it seems not unreasonable to consider, although more work is needed, 
that acquisition of popular authority should give authority to higher 
levels within the Party/State over lower levels, not least to create positive 
feedback by giving people policies that they want.  
Here, the Chia se and à Nng stories are telling. As the two stories 
imply, central to this issue seems to be a use of authority to separate 
political leadership (‘the Party’) from state implementation capacity (a 
notion central to Soviet political thinking as well as to that of Sun Yat 
Sen). A political community usefully feels that government has a capacity 
to ‘act’ – a problem can be identified and then solved. In that fashion, 
authorised political leadership must be able to hold to account those 
made responsible for implementation. In a nutshell, a real Leviathan can 
be expected do things, but a paper one will be seen as being unable to.  
Our Method 
We have attempted to discover Vietnamese perceptions of authority and 
how they are discussed and positioned within power relations. For this 
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purpose, we chose analysis of politics via language in the form of qualita-
tive semi-structured interviews.  
In the following section we present our research data and findings 
to unveil a deeper insight into current Vietnamese understandings of 
authority.  
Section 3 – Political Authority in Vietnam:  
Discussions in Hanoi 2013 and 2014 
Data 
Our research12 involved engaging a range of people, mainly in Hanoi, in 
informal discussions. The interviewees ranged in age from 19 to over 70 
and from a range of social backgrounds with relative gender balance 
(women were slightly less represented than men). The interactions were 
carried out in Vietnamese, with no interpreter, and took the form of 
extended exchanges. The basic stance was an expressed desire on the 
part of the interviewer to be informed, as a non-Vietnamese person 
speaking Vietnamese, by their discussant. Questions were formulated in 
politically neutral ways and did not directly ask for opinions; rather, we 
asked interviewees to help us understand the language and what the 
terms mean. The discussions were ‘open’ and allowed for the interlocu-
tor to go where they saw fit in their explanations.13  
Whilst we put our argument here in Hobbesian terms, the words 
used were not ‘ours’ and were also no more and no less than how our 
Vietnamese interviewees also discussed and explained them. Thus, the 
research process went beyond any technical academic framework of 
                                                 
12  The research reported here was ‘guerrilla’ in nature, involving a series of ad hoc 
meetings, often in public, effectively with strangers. Given the political nature 
of the research, and the dangers of attention from the security forces, we did 
not ask for personal details. Whilst the discussions took place in urban areas, 
this does not necessarily mean that interviewees were ‘urban’. It is our impres-
sion that there was not significant variation in replies across possible categorisa-
tion schemes, but further research would throw light on this.  
13  Vietnamese is written, and understood, as a series of separate syllables. A Viet-
namese word, as written, may have one, two or perhaps three syllables, written 
separately. Therefore Vietnamese words confusingly appear (for the typical 
Western learner) written as a series of what seem to be short words. Thus 
equivalent terms for ‘authority’ may appear as ‘uy’ or as ‘uy quyn’. Both are 
words in the sense of distinct dictionary entries. We found no discernible dif-
ference in usage between ‘uy’ and ‘uy quyn’, so we use these three terms (‘uy’, ‘uy 
quyn’ and authority) interchangeably for the rest of this article. 
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‘social contracts’ and extended to Vietnamese practical issues. During 
our sessions, interviewees actively attempted to engage in discussions 
and to answer questions. None of them shrugged their shoulders and 
said they did not know. They were – strikingly for us – very willing to 
engage in discussion. This seems to indicate an important capacity for a 
future when we could see these debates happening within the Vietnam-
ese political community. Interviewees presented us with what they saw as 
the following varied characteristics of what Vietnamese mean by their 
‘word for authority’. It also suggests that there is a certain positive poten-
tial within the social and cultural (and linguistic) resources that they de-
ployed into the discussion.  
Authority as Fear, or Respect?  
A large majority of interviewees connected authority to the notion of 
fear and awe, and we discovered an overall confusion and difficulty fac-
ing interviewees in explaining whether ‘uy’ is positive or negative. Inter-
viewees often tried to distinguish between a sense of ‘uy’ as entailing fear, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand a sense of ‘uy’ as entailing ‘pres-
tige’. Our sense is that simply translating ‘uy tín’ as prestige may be con-
fusing, as the semantic range includes the sense that the person con-
cerned is (more or less) trusted, honoured and valued.  
Translated into the language of our data, authority (as fear) for 
some is “something that makes other people frightened” (“Cái làm cho 
ng	i khác s”) or connected to “exploitation of a position of power 
(chc quyn), to exert authority (ra uy14) over another so as to force obedi-
ence to oneself” (“Lm dng chc quyn,  ra uy v
i ng	i khác bt ng	i 
khác phi phc tùng theo mình”). Two interviewees expressed authority in 
terms of “intimidating or threatening people, deterrence, being afraid” 
(“S mnh m, oai phong ca ng	i có chc quyn”). Another interviewee 
emphasised that authority “brings fear, creates an invisible strength with 
which it pressures everybody – everybody obeys” (“Mang tính cht s hãi, 
to ra sc mnh sc ép v
i mi ng	i vô hình mi ng	i s nghe theo”). How-
ever, some interviewees understood the word authority as “strength” 
(“sc mnh”) and “respect” (“tôn trng”); for example, “the authority of 
father and mother regarding their child so as to educate and guide” (“Uy 
                                                 
14  VDict (<http://vdict.com/>) translates “ra uy” as to “put on airs”. This is not 
what seems to fit here; though it feels linked to the sense that authority can be 
illegitimate, which is likely the point the interviewee is trying to make. 
  Political Authority in Vietnam 109
 

 
ca b m i v
i con cái  giáo dc, ch bo”). We observed that this posi-
tive sense is barely mentioned in connection to politics. 
Authority as Position or Reputation? 
According to the answers of our interviewees, the sources of ‘uy’ are a 
given. These can be economic or social position, or the power of posi-
tion (‘chc quyn’) – a neat use of word order. The first (qualifying) term 
is ‘chc’, which is well translated as ‘position’ within an organisation (‘t 
chc’), which in the Vietnamese context suggestively means the Party-
State. Thus, according to two interviewees authority (‘uy’) is linked to 
“the strength, somebody with a position of power imposes something on 
us” (“S mnh m, oai phong ca ng	i có chc quyn”). Another interviewee 
describes authority (‘uy quyn’) as follows: “This is not something every-
body has – somebody with a high social position will as a result [of that 
position] have it, somebody with authority may or may not have prestige 
(“uy tín”) … but somebody with prestige often has authority” (“Uy quyn 
không phi ai cng có, ng	i có v trí cao trong xã hi m
i có 	c, ng	i có uy 
quyn có th có hoc không có uy tín … và ng	i có uy tín th	ng có uy quyn”). 
This shows the struggle to differentiate between authority based on posi-
tion and authority based on prestige (honour, trust, value). The subse-
quent quote emphasises the relation between power (coercive) and repu-
tation as follows: “Prestige and power are closely related and interde-
pendent. When there is power, use of it requires prestige for power to 
get maximum results. And it is not certain that somebody with prestige 
will have power. Prestige plus authority equals power”. (“Uy tín và quyn 
lc có mi quan h khng khít, t	ng tr cho nhau. Khi có quyn lc, s dng 
quyn lc thì cn có uy tín thì quyn lc m
i t hiu qu cao nht. Và ch	a 
chc ng	i có uy tín s có quyn lc. Uy tín + uy quyn = quyn lc”). This 
suggests that prestige (honour, value, trust) and authority are both need-
ed if one is to have power; however, only one interviewee was able to 
state this opinion so eloquently. Thus, this interviewee came closest to 
the principal suggestion of this article: power and authority are qualita-
tively very different and power itself is not sufficient to secure good 
results in politics.  
Authority of Individuals or of Institutions? 
Almost all answers concerning authority referred to individuals, not to 
institutions or organisations or their members. Judges, priests, and so on 
are not mentioned, and certainly not Party leaders. Indeed, it is con-
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sistent with our broad arguments that, as they have very little authority, 
Vietnam’s political institutions are not used by the Vietnamese to explain 
authority. The only exception was when one interviewee referenced the 
National Assembly – the Vietnamese parliament. However, this was 
done in negative terms, highlighting authority (“uy quyn”) as “the impo-
sition of will on the people: for example, the National Assembly.” (“S 
áp t ý mun lên nhân dân ví d: Hp quc hi.”). The lack of confidence 
towards political institutions has some important implications. If the 
VCP wants to transition towards governing and create effective and just 
political order, it will have to reform institutions to ensure that they fulfil 
their prescribed roles. That change would be reflected by people’s recog-
nition of the authority of these institutions, which is something we will 
be potentially able to observe in Vietnamese politics in the future.  
One individual who often appears in discussions on authority as an 
example of a person with positive character, a person with “prestige” 
(“uy tín”), is Ho Chi Minh: “Uy tín – this Sino-Vietnamese word, is about 
trust and belief and being praised by everybody in a positive sense. For 
example: The Vietnamese people trust and love H chí Minh” (“Uy tín: 
t hán Vit ó là s tin t	 ng và 	c mi ng	i ca ngi hiu theo ngha tích 
cc, Ví d: H! chí Minh 	c nhân dân Vit nam tin t	 ng và kính yêu”). 
Prestige in Vietnamese (‘uy tín’), as we wrote, has to do with trust and 
belief; people often describe it in the duality of promise followed by acts: 
“Something done to make others believe” (“Cái làm cho ngi khác 
tin”), or “This [prestige] is a way of speaking so that others follow and 
believe in one, and [one] must preserve that trust, and do correctly what 
one has said one will do” “(Uy quyn: không phi ai cng có, ng	i có v trí 
cao trong xã hi m
i có 	c, ng	i có uy quyn có th có hoc không có uy tín 
[…] và ng	i có uy tín th	ng có uy quyn”). This, again, is something that 
seems to be missing currently. 
There was a strong emphasis on Ho Chi Minh’s morality (‘o c’, 
‘c’); ‘morality’, in discussions, is a far more vivid word and, for the 
interviewees, often seemed a more interesting word than ‘authority’. This 
suggests to us that the Vietnamese feel the need to recreate morality in 
politics; it is what they know from their received histories, and perhaps, 
what they believe to be a panacea for the political problems of the pre-
sent. 
Another related finding is that whilst illustrative examples of indi-
viduals with authority are given, they are predominantly abstract. The 
only two exceptions, which were made relatively concrete, were those of 
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the school principal and the parents.15 The other obvious concrete ex-
amples – police, teachers, state officials, Party leaders, etc., and institu-
tions these individuals relate to – were not broached.  
Authority as Power? 
The crucial observation that came out of our interviews is related to one 
phenomenon that occurred repeatedly during our discussions, namely a 
frequent snap change of topic from authority (‘uy quyn’) to power (coer-
cive) (‘quyn lc’). Thus, when asked to do so, the discussants often tried 
to differentiate these two, but then quickly forgot about the distinction 
and returned to using them interchangeably. This suggests that they do 
not yet really think in terms of authority being different from power at 
all. On several occasions, interviewees started to explain authority but 
then, when asked further, shifted to use the term power instead. This 
implies that political discourse in Vietnam is saturated with relations of 
power as domination. The apparent result of such an atmosphere is the 
detachment of people from politics, and this may indeed be desired by 
those who rule. As Nguyen et al. (2016) suggested, reporting that there is 
something like a 50:50 profit share between the de jure owners of their 
sample’s businesses and VCP officials receiving “informal payments”, 
this political crisis is highly profitable for some. 
Contextual Observations Made by Interviewees 
From the answers obtained during our interviews, informed by observa-
tions and informal debate on the streets of Hanoi, we have presented a 
narrative of how the Vietnamese we spoke with saw problems of power 
and authority in Vietnam, viewed through a linguistic lens. However, our 
interviewees often sought to contextualise the question, making three 
general points, as discussed below. 
Politics is a Sensitive Area 
Firstly, many informants’ initial thought on politics in Vietnam was that 
it is “sensitive” (“nhy cm”) or a “forbidden area” (“khu vc cm”). This 
naturally affects people’s response to politics in general and political 
authority in particular. It seems clear that this is part of the existing polit-
ical order.  
                                                 
15  This way of replying occurred despite the interviewer pushing for concrete 
examples. 
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Strong Leadership and Order 
Secondly, political values in Vietnam are generally asserted to be very 
distinct, and so-called traditional values are thought of as formed by 
historical development and cultural specifics. Issues that came up often 
included the struggle of the Vietnamese to keep their identity in a region 
of mighty kingdoms and empires, suggesting that nationalism is strong 
and united leadership in Vietnam preferred. For example, the Vietnam-
ese often express admiration for strong leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir 
Putin (Figure 1 shows some books for sale in Hanoi). At root, this im-
plies a sense that political order with authority is important.  
Figure 1. Books for Sale in Hanoi 
 
Source:  Photo by author(s). 
Morality in Politics 
Thirdly, we noted above that Ho Chi Minh appears often in discussions 
as an archetype of morality and his political thought receives considera-
ble official attention. This seems to indicate political authority, or a 
source of political authority, because, according to the Vietnamese, “mo-
rality” – moral standing – would reportedly lead to respect and obedi-
ence. Thus, an erosion of authority within the political order is generally 
associated with a lack of morality. We can read into this one important 
implication: that the Vietnamese believe that the VCP is not moral 
enough.  
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What Does the Data Tell Us about  
Contemporary Vietnamese Politics?  
Our conclusions from analysing the data can be split into three broad 
categories. 
Authority and Power 
Our data revealed that the Vietnamese struggle to differentiate authority 
from coercive power. Whilst authority (‘uy’) was shown to be important, 
the distinction between rule and government was blurred, which is ex-
pressive of a political situation where actual transition from rule to gov-
ernance remains blocked: there is no ‘two-way street’ leading to a social 
contract between rulers and subjects. It seems that the position of the 
Party is not ‘authorised’; rather, its position more rests on fear and defer-
ence to its perceived power. Therefore, as there is no widespread clear 
idea of authority as something that is acquired, it does not have such 
authority, in general. The Vietnamese seem to think of power and au-
thority as based on fear and, when asked about positive aspects of poli-
tics, they automatically switch the discussion to different terms involving 
what they know from their past; for example, Ho Chi Minh was trusted 
by many as a strong moral personality because they thought he did what 
he had promised and took personal responsibility.  
As we interpret it, viewed dynamically, interviewees suggest that el-
ements in Vietnamese society are groping towards a political restructur-
ing that will allow the country to have political leaders upon whom are 
conferred authority, likely justified by their being deemed ethical and 
moral (‘o c’). Our observations in Vietnam showed that the Viet-
namese believe that if politicians become moral, it would potentially 
improve many of the country’s political problems. This suggests that the 
nagging issues of inadequate state capacity – highlighted, for example, in 
donor concerns about the need for new powerful and implementable 
policies if Vietnam is to avoid the ‘middle income trap’ – are at root due 
to the political failure to acquire authority from the population and, 
therefore, over the state apparatus. Generalised – normal – policy im-
plementability is a consequence of capacity, not directly of authority, 
although authority seems to confer a better likelihood of being obeyed 
by officials as well as the general population.  
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Neoliberalism in Vietnam? 
As we have noted, many analyses view contemporary Vietnam as a ‘ne-
oliberal project’, where the Party is seen as a coherent actor deploying 
powers sufficient for it to be seen as the author of a reform project and, 
more specifically, using techniques of power that ‘construct subjects’.  
It is clear from our interviews that because there is no clear sense 
that ‘uy’ refers to acquired authority, Vietnamese cannot easily be consid-
ered to be political ‘subjects’. If the VCP wants to be a neoliberal project 
(without any judgement about whether it should be the goal in Vietnam), 
and if it wants to use neoliberal governing techniques, it must reform 
politically and, concurrently, secure authority.  
Is There a Vietnamese Leviathan? 
The third category concerns possible answers to the question of whether 
the VCP is a Leviathan. Leviathan in Hobbes’s writing is an impersonal 
entity that stands above both rulers and ruled (Hobbes and Tuck 2003). 
We argue that, at a symbolic level, this basic Hobbesian premise of au-
thority is missing in Vietnam. Leviathan in Vietnam is not above those 
who rule (the VCP) or those who are ruled (Vietnamese society). Instead, 
those who rule in Vietnam, the VCP, artificially and somewhat dubiously 
position themselves as a Leviathan Party-State and do not act as though 
it was an ‘absolute power above them all’. In terms of the postmodern 
thinking of Claude Lefort, explained by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, that position has to “stay vacant” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 
186).  
‘You can have power without authority, but you cannot 
have authority without power’ 
This well-known saying throws light upon the issues facing regime ad-
herents in Vietnam.  
The à Nng story is here very indicative. Authority, as part of a 
‘two-way street’, is acquired by doing things that people want, which 
requires both finding out what they actually do want, and then delivering 
it to them. Generalised policy implementability is a consequence of ca-
pacity, not directly of authority. This suggests that future research should 
examine how authority (uy) can be linked to capacity; that is, to the per-
ceived effectiveness of the state, especially in the eyes of regime adher-
ents. This clearly entails an examination of different forms of power and 
deeper discussion of the meanings of the word ‘power’ (quyn). Further 
  Political Authority in Vietnam 115
 

 
research, and likely time, is needed in order to see how use of this term 
may evolve and throw light upon Vietnam’s political opportunities. This 
may happen sooner rather than later. As we argued at the start of the 
paper, regime success cannot now so easily rely upon old and anachro-
nistic forms of power (propaganda, a theatrical and fake constitutional-
ism, a judiciary and security forces directly controlled by the Party, Len-
inist Mass Organisations, hostility to civil society, etc.). It must deploy 
new forms of power, and we suggest that acquired authority, giving a 
tendency to ‘general obedience’, would allow for deployment of policies 
that would in general encourage the population to feel comfortable with 
granting the regime that authority. However, it is clear from our data that 
this is not the case.  
References  
Akram-Lodhi, A. H. (2007), Land Markets and Rural Livelihoods in 
Vietnam, in: A. H. Akram-Lodhi, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., and Cris-
to	bal Kay (eds), Land, Poverty and Livelihoods in an Era of Globalization: 
Perspectives from Developing and Transition Countries, New York: Rout-
ledge, 152–187. 
Arendt, Hannah (1961), Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political 
Thought, New York: The Viking Press. 
Badie, Bertrand, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino (eds) 
(2011), International Encyclopedia of Political Science, Sage Publications. 
Beresford, Melanie (2008), Doi Moi in Review: The Challenges of Build-
ing Market Socialism in Vietnam, in: Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 
2, 221–243.  
Berliner, Tom, Do Kinh Thanh, and Adam McCarty (2013), Inequality, 
Poverty Reduction and the Middle-Income Trap in Vietnam, Hanoi: EU and 
Mekong Economics. 
Cherry, Haydon (2016), The State in Vietnam, in: Journal of Vietnamese 
Studies, 11, 3-4, 1–16. 
Craig, David, and Douglas Porter (2006), Development Beyond Neoliberal-
ism?: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
de Vylder, Stefan, and Adam Fforde (1996), From Plan to Market: The 
Economic Transition in Vietnam, with Stefan de Vylder, Boulder CO: 
Westview. 
Fforde, Adam (forthcoming 2018), Myths in the Understanding of the 
Process of doi moi, in: C. Earl (ed.), Mythbusting Vietnam: Facts, Fic-
tions, Fantasies, Copenhagen: NIAS. 
  116 Adam Fforde and Lada Homutova 
 
Fforde, Adam (2011), Contemporary Vietnam: Political Opportunities, 
Conservative Formal Politics and Patterns of Radical Change, in: 
Asian Politics and Policy, 3, 2, 165–184. 
Fforde, Adam (2009), Luck, Policy or Something Else Entirely? Vi-
etnam’s Economic Performance in 2009 and Prospects for 2010, in: 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 28, 4, 71–94, online: 
<https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/171/ 
171> (8 January 2018). 
Fforde, Adam (2007), Vietnamese State Industry and the Political Economy of 
Commercial Renaissance: Dragon’s Tooth or Curate’s Egg?, Oxford: Chan-
dos. 
Fforde, Adam, and Vladimir Mazyrin (forthcoming 2018), Soviet Influ-
ence on Vietnamese Development Policy: Some Myths, in: C. Earl 
(ed.), Mythbusting Vietnam: Facts, Fictions, Fantasies, Copenhagen: 
NIAS. 
Gainsborough, Martin (2010), Vietnam: Rethinking the State, London: Zed 
Books. 
Gainsborough, Martin (2007), From Patronage to Outcomes: Vietnam’s 
Communist Party Congresses Reconsidered, in: Journal of Vietnamese 
Studies, 2, 1, 3–26.  
Gill, Indermit S., and Kharas Homi (2007), An East Asian Renaissance: 
Ideas for Economic Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Gillespie, John (2006), Transplanting Commercial Law Reform – Developing a 
‚Rule of Law‘ in Vietnam, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Goertzel, Ted (2006), Brazilian Social Attitudes in Comparative Perspective, 
paper presented at the VIII International Congress of the Brazilian 
Studies Association Nashville, Tennessee, 16 October. 
Goodin, Robert E., and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996), A New Hand-
book of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harms, Erik (2009), Vietnam’s Civilizing Process and the Retreat from 
the Street: A Turtle’s Eye View from Ho Chi Minh City, in: City & 
Society, 21, 2, 182–206.  
Hinsley, Francis H. (1986), Sovereignty, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas, and Jonathan Bennet (2004), Leviathan, online: <www. 
earlymoderntexts.com/authors/hobbes> (10 January 2018).  
Hobbes, Thomas, and J. C. A. Gaskin (1998), Leviathan, Oxford World’s 
Classics, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Hobbes, Thomas, and Crawford B. Macpherson (1986), Leviathan, Har-
mondsworth: Penguin. 
  Political Authority in Vietnam 117
 

 
Hobbes, Thomas, and Richard Tuck (2003), Leviathan, Cambridge Texts 
in the History of Political Thought, Revised Student Edition, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Kurian, George T. (2011), The Encyclopedia of Political Science, Washington, 
DC: CQ Press.  
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe (2001), Hegemony and Socialist Strate-
gy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, New York: Verso.  
Le Duc Thuy (1993), Economic doi moi in Vietnam, in: W. S. Turley and 
M. Selden (eds), Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi in Compara-
tive Perspective, Boulder CO: Westview, 97–106. 
Masina, Pietro P. (2012), Vietnam between Developmental State and 
Neoliberalism: The Case of the Industrial Sector, in: C. Kyung-Sup, 
B. Fine, and L. Weiss (eds), Developmental Politics in Transition: The Ne-
oliberal Era and Beyond, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 188–210. 
Masina, Pietro P. (2006), Vietnam’s Development Strategies, New York: 
Routledge. 
McElwee, Pamela (2009), Reforesting ‘Bare Hills’ in Vietnam: Social and 
Environmental Consequences of the 5 Million Hectare Reforesta-
tion Program, in: Ambio, 38, 6, 325–333.  
Ngc Linh (2015), Kh
c phc tình trng “trên bo di không nghe”  
nam gii (How to deal with the situation of “superiors instruct, in-
ferior levels do not listen” regarding men), in: Dan Tri on line, 19 
August, online: <http://dantri.com.vn/suc-khoe/khac-phuc-tinh-
trang-tren-bao-duoi-khong-nghe-o-nam-gioi-20150819080816154. 
htm> (15 March 2017). 
Nguyen Thang Vo, Bao D. Ho, Canh Q. Le, and Hung V. Nguyen 
(2016), Strategic and Transactional Costs of Corruption: Perspec-
tives from Vietnamese Firms, in: Crime, Law and Social Change, 65, 4, 
351–374, doi: <10.1007/s10611-016-9609-7>. 
Nguyen Th Lam (2012), Ch ngha Tam dân ca Tôn Trung Sn - Mt trong 
nh"ng ngu!n gc hình thành t	 t	 ng H! Chí Minh (The Three Principles 
of the People of Sun Yat Sen – One of the origins of the formation of Ho Chi 
Minh Thought), online: <http://hocvienchinhtribqp.edu.vn/index.ph 
p/tu-tuong-tam-guong-dao-duc-ho-chi-minh/chu-nghia-tam-dan-
cua-ton-trung-son-mot-trong-nhung-nguon-goc-hinh-thanh-tu-tu 
ong-ho-chi-minh.html> (7 May 2017). 
Nguyen-Vo, Thu Huong (2008), The Ironies of Freedom: Sex, Culture, and 
Neoliberal Governance in Vietnam, (Critical Dialogues in Southeast 
Asian Studies), University of Washington Press. 
  118 Adam Fforde and Lada Homutova 
 
Ohno, Kenichi (n/d), The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialisa-
tion Strategies in East Africa and Asia, Tokyo: GRIPS Development 
Forum. 
Salemink, Oscar (2006), Translating, Interpreting and Practicing Civil 
Society in Vietnam: A Tale of Calculated Misunderstandings, in: D. 
Lewis and D. Mosse (eds), Development Brokers and Translators: The 
Ethnography of Aid and Agencies, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 101–
126.  
Schwenkel, Christina, and Ann-Marie Leshkowich (2012), Introduction: 
How Is Neoliberalism Good to Think Vietnam? How Is Vietnam 
Good to Think Neoliberalism?, in: Christina Schwenkel and Ann-
Marie Leshkowich (guest eds), ‘Neoliberalism in Vietnam.’ Positions 
Asia Critique, Spring, 20, 2, 379–401. 
Tran Van Tho (2013), The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations, Asian Development Bank Institute 
Working Paper Series. 
World Bank (2013), Vietnam Development Report 2014: Skilling Up Vietnam: 
Preparing the Workforce for a Modern Market Economy, Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2011), Vietnam Development Report 2012: Market Economy for a 
Middle-income Vietnam, Hanoi: World Bank. 
World Bank (2006), Agriculture Report, no provenance cited. 
 
